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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST BECOMES
LESS RATIONAL- United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166 (1980) AND Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981).

I.

INTRODUCTION

The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws l
"does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of per
sons in different ways."2 Equal protection, however, does limit the
legislative power to classify. Depending upon the interest affected,
the United States Supreme Court has developed different methods to
decide whether the classification is constitutionally permissible.
If the classification "operates to the disadvantage of some sus
pect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implic
itly protected by the Constitution,"3 the classification is subjected to
the "most rigid scrutiny"4 and will be sustained only if it is a neces
sary means of furthering a compelling state interest. 5
When strict scrutiny is not appropriate, the Court will employ
either the "rational basis" test, a minimal level of scrutiny requiring
I. U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § I. The requirement of equal protection applies to
the federal government through the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499

(1954).
2.

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971); see a/so McDonaldv. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(19II); Barbier v. Connolly, II3 U.S. 27 (1885).
3. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17 (1973). Classifica
tions based upon race, national origin, and alienage have been identified as suspect. See
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (alienage); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (race); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)
(national origin). Fundamental rights include voting, criminal appeals, and the right of
interstate travel. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (interstate
travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (voting); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (criminal appeals).
4. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
5. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
429
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only that the classification be rational,6 or an intermediate standard
of review that falls between strict scrutiny and minimum scrutiny.7
"Intermediate review"8 has been applied to classifications based
upon gender9 and illegitimacy. 10 The rational basis test is employed
when the classification is contained within social and economic legis
lation. 11 How this test works is a subject of disagreement within the
Court: "Despite the narrowness of the issue, this Court in earlier
cases has not been altogether consistent . . . in this area." 12
This note examines the inconsistency in light of two decisions
from the 1980 Supreme Court term: United States Ral1road Retire
ment Board v. Fritz 13 and Schweiker v. Wilson. 14 An overview of the
state of the rational basis test prior to these two cases first will be
discussed. Parts III and IV provide a detailed analysis of the deci
sions. This note will demonstrate that Fritz and Wilson do not bring
the Court any closer to a conclusive method of reviewing social and
economic legislation against equal protection challenges. Part V will
discuss Justice Powell's dissent in Wilson and his proposed solution
to the problem. IS
II.

THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST: AN OVERVIEW

In the area of economic and social welfare legislation, a classifi
6. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17 (1973). See G.
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670-72 (10th ed. 1980).
7. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972). Justice Marshall believes that the Court's equal protection decisions do
not fall into two neat categories, but rather he has indicated that the Court applies a
spectrum of standards to the challenged legislation. According to Justice Marshall's
view, the degree of scrutiny applied depends upon "the constitutional and societal impor
tance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon
which the particular classification is drawn." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodri
guez, 411 U.S. I, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White also has endorsed
this view. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring); see L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1082-92 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L. TRIBE).
8. L. TRIBE, supra note 7, at 1082.
9. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
10. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
11. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). "In the area of economics
and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because
the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reason
able basis,' it does not offend the Constitution. . . ." Id. (quoting Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911».
12. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980).
13. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
14. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
15. See text accompanying notes 130-31 infra.
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cation must be rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. 16
This is mandated by the equal protection clause and is not a matter
of dispute within the Court.17 For the Court to find this rational
relation, the relation need not exist in fact: It is enough that the
legislature "could rationally have decided" there was a connection
between the purpose and the classification. IS The disagreement over
rationality review arises over the selection of the purpose against
which the classification will be tested. It is a dispute which goes to
the heart of judicial review; how closely the Court should scrutinize
legislative enactments.
The Court sometimes uses an approach in which the require
ment for rationality is satisfied "if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify [the classification)." 19 This view, the conceiv
able basis20 approach, affords great deference to the legislature. As it
permits a purpose for the classification to be offered after the classifi
cation is established by the legislature, a hypothesized purpose can
be tailored to fit the classification. 21 This approach constituted the
16. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533
(1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S.
78,81 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). The legitimacy aspect of the rational basis standard will not be
covered in this article. For a discussion of that limitation, see Bennett, "Mere" Rational
ity in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and .Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049,
1070-88 (1979).
17. The rational basis test has been employed since at least 1897, when the Court
stated: "[T]o relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, . . . it must appear. . . that a classification . . . is one based upon some
reasonable ground ... and is not a mere arbitrary selection." Gulf Colo. & Santa Fe
Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165-66 (1897). Despite this history, at least one commentator
disagrees with the assumption that there is a constitutional requirement of rationality:
"[T]he dogma that [due process] requires every law to be a rational means to a legislative
end is itself not a rational premise for judicial review and. . . is even less plausible as a
constitutional command to lawmakers . . . ." Linde, .Due Process oj'Law Making, 55
NEB. L. REV. 197, 235-36 (1976).
18. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981). Clover
Leoj'involved an equal protection challenge to a statute that banned the retail sale of
milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers. Id. at 458. Petitioners presented
evidence that there was no actual link between the legislature's purpose, to promote en
ergy savings, and the classification. Id. at 463-64. The Court held the empirical evidence
to be irrelevant: "States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their
legislative judgments. Rather, 'those challenging the legislative judgment must convince
the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could
not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.''' Id. at 464
(quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, III (1979».
19. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
20. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); L.
TRIBE, supra note 7, at 996.
21. There is some question as to whether a statute could ever be invalidated if this
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only rational basis test from the 1940's through the 1960's.22 Not
suprisingly, it resulted in the invalidation of few statutes. 23
In the 1970's, a new view of the rational basis test emerged, one
which would not have the classification tested against any purpose,
but against "some legitimate, articulated legislative purpose."24 The
articulated purpose approach obviously is more restrictive than the
conceivable basis view because a classification cannot be justified by
virtue of a post hoc purpose.
The articulated purpose approach has not displaced the con
ceivable basis approach. 25 Both views have been utilized by the
Court. 26 Thus, the Court concurrently maintains two standards by
which to evaluate social and economic legislation for equal protec
tion violations. The standard that the Court chooses to employ
test were honestly employed. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Pro
tection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128-32 (1972).
22. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Mc
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483
(1955); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552 (1947).
23. Only one statute was held to be unconstitutional. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457 (1957). Morey, though subsequently overruled by City of New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976), saw the Coun strike down a statute which exempted the Ameri
can Express Company from requirements penaining to the sale of money orders. Morey
v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 458 (1957).
24. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) ("State's
classification rationally funhers the purpose identified by the State") (emphasis added);
see City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304 (1976) ("classification rationally
funhers the purpose which the ... city had identified as its objective") (emphasis added);
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17 (1973) ("articulated state
purpose") (emphasis added); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973) ("articulated
state purpose") (emphasis added). The Coun uses the terms "aniculated" and "identi
fied" interchangeably; each indicates the express purpose of the legislature. If the legisla
ture's purpose for a classification is not stated explicitly, but is implicit in either the
legislative history or the legislation itself, the articulated purpose approach still would be
proper. The key element ofthe aniculated purpose approach is that it assesses legislation
in light of the legislature's actual purpose and while this purpose is most easily recog
nized when explicitly aniculated by the legislature, it can be found in other ways. See,
e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 235-36.
25. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
26. Compare United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 178; Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970);
and McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969), which employed
the conceivable basis approach with Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 235; Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); City of New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. i97, 304 (1976); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17
(1973); and McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973), which employed the anicu
lated purpose approach.
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could mean a difference in the Court's holding. 27
III.
A.

FRITZ

Facts

In Fritz, the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection chal
lenge to the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974. 28 The 1974 Act ex
cluded certain workers from receiving benefits that they had earned
under the 1974 Act's predecessor, the Railroad Retirement Act of
1937. 29 It was this exclusion that gave rise to the suit.30 Prior to the
1974 Act, a worker became eligible for both Social Security and
Railroad Retirement benefits by working the requisite number of
years in nonrailroad and railroad employment. 31 If the worker also
qualified for social security benefits by working for a sufficient pe
riod outside the railroad industry, he would be eligible for benefits
under both the Social Security and Railroad Retirement systems. 32
Because of the way in which the benefits were computed, a worker
who qualified for benefits under both systems received more money
than one who had worked for the same amount of time but had not
split his employment between railroad and nonrailroad employ
ment. 33 The cost of this extra amount, the windfall benefit, was
borne entirely by the Railroad Retirement Account34 and had placed
27. While the articulated purpose approach is the stricter form of review, it never
has been used to invalidate a statute.
28. 45 U.S.c. §§ 231-231t (1976).
29. Pub. L. No. 75-162, ch. 382, 50 Stat. 307 (1937) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.c. §§ 231-231t (1976».
30. See notes 43-51 infra and accompanying text.
31. Pub. L. No. 75-162, ch. 382, 50 Stat. 307 (1937) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 231-231t (1976».
32. Id.
33. 449 U.S. at 168 n.1. The Fritz Court used the following example:
[I]f 10 years of either railroad or nonrailroad employment would produce a
monthly benefit of $300, an additional 10 years of the same employment at the
same level of creditable compensation would not double that benefit, but would
increase it by some lesser amount to say $500. If that 20 years of service had
been divided equally between railroad and nonrailroad employment, however,
the social security benefit would be $300 and the railroad retirement benefit
would also be $300, for a total benefit of $600. The $100 difference in the exam
ple constitutes the 'windfall' benefit.
Id.; see S. REP. No. 1163, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 5703-04 [hereinafter cited as S. REp. No. 1163].
34. See Pub. L. No. 82-234, ch. 632 § 22(b), 65 Stat. 683, 687 (1951) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.c. 231(f)(c)(2) (1976»; S. REP. No. 1163, supra note 30, at 2-3, re
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 5703-04; COMMISSION ON RAILROAD
RETIREMENT, THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT SYSTEM: ITS COMING CRISIS, H.R. Doc.
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the Railroad Retirement System in financial jeopardy.35
Congress received a study36 of the problem by the Commission
on Railroad Retirement37 and, as a result, established the Joint La
bor-Management Railroad Retirement Negotiating Committee38
(Joint Committee), which was composed of representatives of rail
road management and labor. 39 Congress directed the Joint Commit
tee to prepare a bill that would ensure the solvency of the railroad
retirement system. 40 The Joint Committee outlined its proposals for
a bill,41 and Congress, using the proposals, enacted the 1974 Act.42
The principal purpose of the bill, to place the Railroad Retire
ment System "on a sound financial basis,"43 was to be accomplished
through the 1974 Act by reducing the windfall benefit drain. 44 All
future accruals of the windfall were eliminated; those who had not
worked the requisite ten years by the date on which the 1974 Act
went into effect45 would not get the windfall. 46 Many of those em
ployees who already had earned the right to the windfall would re
ceive it. The workers excluded from receiving their vested windfall
benefits were those who had left the railroad industry before 1974
without having completed twenty-five years of service, had not re
tained a "current connection"47 with the industry at the close of
1974, and had not qualified for Social Security benefits as of the year
No. 350, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, 24, 73, 344, 355-56 (1972) [hereinafter cited as COMMIS
SION REPORT).
35. S. REP. No. 1163, supra note 33, at 1-2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS at 5702.
36. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 34.
37. In 1970, Congress established the Commission on Railroad Retirement to
make a study of the railroad retirement system and to make recommendations to Con
gress as to how to alleviate the retirement system's financial difficulties. See Pub. L. No.
91-377, ch. 382, § 7, 84 Stat. 791, 792-94 (1970).
38. See Pub. L. No. 93-69, ch. 382, § 107, 87 Stat. 162, 165 (1973).
39. The district court felt that the lack of public representation on the Joint Com
mittee led to the challenged classification. Jurisdictional Statement at 10a-13a, United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdic
tional Stateinent).
40. Pub. L. No. 93-69, ch. 382, § 107, 87 Stat. at 165 (1973).
41. See 120 CONGo REC. 18391-412 (1974).
42. Pub. L. No. 93-445, 88 Stat. 1305 (1974) (codified at 45 U.S.c. §§ 231-231t
(1976».
43. See S. REP. No. 1163, supra note 33, at I, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS at 5702.
44. ld. at II, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 5711.
45. The 1974 Act went into effect on January I, 1975.
46. 45 U.S.C. § 23 I (b)(h)(1976); see S. REP. No. 1163, supra note 33, at 7, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 5707.
47. The term "current connection" means being employed by the railroad during
12 of the preceeding 30 months. See 45 U.S.C. § 231(0) (1976).
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they left railroad employment. 48
Those harmed by this exclusion filed a class action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. 49 Plaintiff
class sought a judgment declaring that the provision of the 1974 Act
that expressly preserves windfall benefits for some employees irra
tionally distinguishes between classes of annuitants.50 The excluded
class claimed it was irrational for Congress to distinguish between
classes of beneficiaries "simply on the basis of whether they had a
'current connection' with the railroad industry as of the changeover
date or as of the date of retirement."51 The district court held the
classification to be "arbitrary, capricious and irrational and [one
which] denies Plaintiff Class equal protection under the law."52 The
Supreme Court, with two Justices dissenting, 53 reversed.54
The Court decided that minimum scrutiny was the proper stan
dard of review 55 and found the classification not to be "patently ar
bitrary or irrational"56 but, rather, logically related to the goal of
achieving equity between current and former railroad employees. 57
The achievement of equity was not mentioned by Congress as a goal
it wished to accomplish by denying appellants the windfall. Rather,
this goal actually is inimical to an explicitly stated purpose of Con
gress: to preserve benefits for those who had a vested right to them.58
Appellant Board did not attempt to show that equity between classes
of railroad employees was Congress' articulated purpose for the clas
sification. Rather, Appellant Board maintained, and the Court
agreed, that this purpose rationally could have been sought by
Congress.59
48. The various benefit qualifying provisions of the 1974 Act are found at 45
U.S.C. § 23 I(b)(h) (1976).
49. 449 U.S. at 173.
50. Id.
5!. Id. at 173-74.
52. Jurisdictional Statement at 36a, supra note 39.
53. 449 U.S. at 182 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 174. Fritz was appealed to the Supreme Court in accordance with 28
U.S.c. § 1252 (1976) which allows a direct appeal to the Supreme Court when a lower
court holds an act of Congress unconstitutional. The district court opinion is
unpublished.
55. 449 U.S. at 174-75.
56. /d. at 177.
57. Id. at 177-78.
58. See note 65 infra.
59. 449 U.S. at 177-78; Brief for Appellant at 30-32, United States R.R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
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B. Legislative History
When Congress directed the Joint Committee to prepare legisla
tion to make the Railroad Retirement System actuarially sound, it
did not give the Committee free reign. The Joint Committee was to
"take into account the specific recommendations of the Commission
on Railroad Retirement."6o One of four recommendations 61 made
by the Commission was that the windfall benefit should not be elimi
nated for those who had vested right to it. 62 At that time, Congress
gave no indication that it intended to exclude appellees from receiv
ing the windfall.
The Joint Committee did not follow the recommendation, and
the proposed bill including the classification in question, was submit
ted to Congress. 63 The bill was passed with the exclusion intact,64
yet Congress indicated that its original goals had not changed. 65
Between the time the Joint Committee's proposal was submitted
to Congress and the time the 1974 Act was enacted, Congress con
ducted hearings on the proposal. 66 As the legislation being discussed
was complex and was drafted by outside parties, Congress was
dependent upon those parties for an explanation of the proposed
legislation. The Joint Committee members, however, were not
straightforward when they testified regarding the impact that the leg
islation would have on appellees. 67
60. Pub. L. No. 93-69, ch. 382, § 107, 87 Stat. 162, 165 (1973).
61. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 34, at 368-69.
62. Id. at 367-69.
63. See 120 CONGo REC. 18391-412 (1974).
64. See 45 U.S.C. § 231(b)(h) (1976).
65. See S. REP. No. 1163, supra note 33, at 1-2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS at 5702. One of the announced purposes of both the United States Senate
and the House of Representatives in passing the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 was to
protect the persons in Fritz's class:
The Bill provides for a complete restructuring of the Railroad Retirement
Act of 1937 and will place it on a sound financial basis . . . .
Persons in receipt of both Railroad Retirement and Social Security benefits
as of December 31, 1974 will continue to receive benefits under both systems
without any reduction in those benefits. Persons who already have vested rights
under both the Railroad Retirement and the Social Security systems will in the
future be permitted to receive benefits computed under both systems just as is
true under existing law.
Id.
66. See Restructuring of the Railroad Retirement System: Hearings on H.R. 15301
Bifore the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 214
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Committee Hearings].
67. Justice Brennan found that the misstatements were frequent and unrebutted
and that "no Member of Congress [could] be found to have stated the effect of the classi
fication correctly . . . ." 449 U.S. at 193 (Brennan, J., dissen!ing). William Dempsey,
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An explanation for this testimony can be found in the decision
of the district court. That court found that the Joint Committee, in
stead of protecting the interests of the Fritz class as directed by Con
gress,68 "traded off the plaintiff class of beneficiaries to achieve
added benefits for their current employees. . . ."69 This reading of
the testimony was rejected by appellanUo
The district court found, and Justices Brennan and Marshall
agreed,71 that because of this testimony and as the classification de
feated a stated purpose of Congress,72 the enactment of the classifica
tion was inadvertent. 73 This is not necessarily true; other reasons
could explain the enactment. 74 The Fritz Court did not conclusively
uphold an inadvertent classification. The Court's relaxed standard
of review, however, allowed a purpose never mentioned by Congress
to sustain a classification that defeated an articulated purpose of
Congress.
chairman of the management negotiators on the Joint Committee and principal witness
at the hearings, told the Congressional Committee:
[P)rotection [will) be accorded to people who are on the rolls now receiving dual
benefits and those who are vested under both systems as of January I, 1975, the
idea of the Commission being, and we agree with this, that these individuals
had a right to rely upon the law as it existed when they were working. They
have made their contributions. They have relied upon the law. They ...
should be protected.
Commillee Hearings, supra note 66, at 214. There was also the following exchange be
tween Dempsey and Representative Dingell:
Mr. DlNGELL: Who is going to be adversely affected? Somebody has to
get it in the neck on this. Who is going to be that lucky fellow?
Mr. DEMPSEY: Well, I don't think so really. I think this is the situation
in which everyone wins. Let me explain.
Mr. DINGELL: Mr. Dempsey, I see some sleight of hand here but I don't
see how it is happening. I applaud it but I would like to understand it. My
problem is that you are going to go to a realistic system that is going to cost less
but pay more in benefits. Now if you have accomplished this, I suggest we
should put you in charge of the social security system.
Id. at 199, 201.
68. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
69. Jurisdictional Statement at 13, supra note 39.
70. See Brief for Appellant at 53-54, supra note 59.
71. 449 U.S. at 193 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. See note 65 supra.
73. Jurisdictional Statement at 33, supra note 39.
74. For political reasons, Congress may not have wanted to state explicitly that an
effect of the Retirement Act would be to deprive annuitants of vested benefits. S. REP.
No. 1163, supra note 33, at 1-2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 5702.
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C. Analysis

In upholding the windfall exclusion against the equal protection
challenge, the Court applied the conceivable basis approach of the
rational basis test.7 5 The Court did not claim that Congress actually
had the goal of creating equity among the annuitants, nor did it see
this as important: "It is, of course, 'constitutionally irrelevant
whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision.' "76
The goal of equity, although supplied by appellant and not by Con
gress, was enough to sustain the legislation because "Congress could
properly conclude" there was a rational"link between the exclusion
and providing for equity among those who were to receive the
windfall. 77
The Court, acknowledging the confusion that surrounds the ra
tional relationship test,78 attempted to clarify the views of that test.
The notion that legislation was to be tested against the purposes
which accompanied it was emphatically rejected: "[T]his Court has
never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enact
ing a statute."79 The Court stated that j)andridge v. Wil/iams 8o and
Jeff"erson v. Hackney,81 along with Fritz, established the proper ap
plication of the test. 82 j)andridge and Jeff"erson, like Fritz, were pub
lic benefit cases that employed the conceivable basis approach of
rationality review. 83
75. See 449 U.S. at 174-78. Justice Brennan, while holding that the rational basis
test called for testing classifications against the actual purposes of Congress, stated that
the Fritz classification did not even rationally relate to the post hoc purpose of equity. Id.
at 193-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It appears, however, that Justice Brennan tested the
relationship between the offered purpose and the classification against a stricter standard
than is proper for the rationality requirement. A social or economic statute does not
violate equal protection strictures if the legislature rationally could have seen a link be
tween purpose and classification. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. Justice
Brennan tested the Fritz classification for an actual link. See 449 U.S. at 193-97 (Bren
nan, J., dissenting).
76. 449 U.S. at 179 (quoting Fleinming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960».
77. Id. at 178.
78. "[TJhis court ... has not been altogether consistent in its pronouncements in
this area." Id. at 174.
79. Id. at 179.
80. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
81." 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
82. 449 U.S. at 176-77 n.lO.
83. Dandridge dealt with a Maryland regulation that imposed a maximum limit on
the total amount of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits anyone
family could receive. Beneficiaries with large families claimed that the regulation vio
lated the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court held that the regulation was ra
tionally related to the purpose of encouraging employment. 397 U.S. at 486-87. In
Jefferson, the Court upheld a section of the Texas State Constitution that resulted in
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As previously mentioned, the more deferential view of mini
mum scrutiny makes the task of the party attacking the legislation
extremely burdensome. 84 The contestant will win only if no pur
poses are advanced which Congress could have seen as rationally
related to the classification. While difficult, the challenger's task is
not impossible. The Court will strike down legislation if it
"manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in ra
tional justification."85 While the question of what constitutes arbi
trariness has not been answered by the Court, Fritz went a long way
in showing what is not arbitrary.
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, noted that strong evi
dence exists indicating that Congress did not deliberately create the
windfall exclusion. 86 The exclusion not only is unsupported by legis
lative history, but it defeats an explicitly articulated goal of Con
gress: to protect those with vested interests. 87 The Fritz Court was
unconvinced that Congress was unaware of what it accomplished be
cause "[t]he language of the statute is clear, and we have historically
assumed that Congress intended what it enacted."88
Relying on the assumption that Congress intends what it enacts,
the Court did not abandon the proposition that irrational statutory
classifications are unconstitutional. 89 The Court did not hold that
classifications enacted by virtue of oversight invariably are rational.
Rather, what the Court did was to set a standard by which legislation
will be tested when an attempt is made to demonstrate congressional
oversight.
If "[t]he language of the statute is clear,"9o the Court will as
sume that the classification was intentional and not a product of
oversight. Thus, the only chance a litigant has of showing inadver
tence is if the statute is unclear. What would be considered unclear
is not specified. Apparently, few statutes would qualify, as the wind~
fall classification, a complex and confusing piece of legislation,91 was
lower payments for AFDC recipients than for recipients of other welfare programs. The
Court, citing Dandridge, held that it was not irrational for the state to conclude that the
young are more adaptable than the sick and elderly. 406 U.S. at 549-51.
84. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
85. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (\960).
86. See 449 U.S. at 189-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. See note 65 supra.
88. 449 U.S. at 179.
89. See id. at 177.
90. Id. at 179.
91. The legislative history demonstrates that the legislators found the statute con
fusing. See note 67 supra.
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considered to be clear. Unless the statutory scheme is less clear than
the windfall classification, evidence of congressional oversight is ir
relevant in an attempt to show a lack of rational connection between
classification and purpose. Fritz closed off an avenue through which
irrationality might be demonstrated; as a result, rationality review,
already deferential, becomes even more so. -The Court essentially
discarded what one commentator has considered the only legitimate
function of minimum scrutiny: to guard against "inadvertent
arbitrariness. . . ."92
Fritz did not explicitly alter the role of minimum scrutiny. The
Court claimed that it will strike down all arbitrary classifications that
come before it. 93 Because the Court found the Fritz classification
rational, however, this assurance is without substance. Fritz virtu
ally eliminated the possibility that a classification might be found to
exist by virtue of congressional oversight. An oversight cannot be
responsible for the classification; thus, the classification must have
been enacted for a reason. Once the Court has decided that a classi
fication has a purpose, the requirement of rationality is easily satis
fied. A merely plausible purpose is all that need be supplied. As
suggested by Justice Brennan, "the mode of analysis employed by
the Court in this case virtually immunizes social and economic legis
lative classifications from judicial review."94
92.

See Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
L. REV. 1023, 1074 (1979).
93. "The ... question is whether Congress achieved its purpose in a patently arbi
trary or irrational way." 449 U.S. at 177. The implication is that if Congress had acted
arbitrarily or irrationally, the legislation would have been invalidated.
94. Id. at 183 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan accused the Fritz majority
of abandoning an essential step in applying the rational basis test: identifying the pur
pose of the statute. Id. at 186-87. It is only then, Justice Brennan continued, that the
Court can determine whether the requirement for rationality is met. Id. Justice Brennan
found the Court's reasoning to be tautologous: "It may always be said that Congress
intended to do what it in fact did. If that were the extent of our analysis, we would find
every statute, no matter how arbitrary or irrational, perfectly tailored to achieve its pur
pose." Id. at 187.
While the Fritz rationale makes it nearly impossible to demonstrate irrationality, the
holding did not go as far as Justice Brennan claimed. Fritz did identify a statutory pur
pose.
Under Justice Brennan's view of the Court's reasoning, the very existence of a classi
fication implies a rational purpose. Thus, there always would be a rational link between
the purpose and classification. Justice Brennan's view, however, is incorrect because the
Court concluded only that a classification implies a purpose. See id. at 177. The Court
did not state that the implied purpose necessarily would be rational, and thus, left itself
the option to declare a classification irrational.
COLUM.
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WILSON

Facts

One week after Fritz was decided, the Court heard oral argu
ment on Schweiker v. Wilson,95 another equal protection case involv
ing the rational basis test. The result in Wilson was the same as the
result in Fritz, but the rationale employed was not. A remarkable
element of Fritz was the care the Court took to define the proper role
of minimum scrutiny: Classifications need not be tested against the
legislature's articulated purpose. 96 An equally noteworthy element
of Wilson is that this view, supported by a clear majority in Fritz,
was not evidenced in Wilson.
In 1972, Congress amended the Social Security Act to create the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program,97 the stated purpose
of which was to provide a subsistence allowance to the aged, blind,
and disabled. 98 Inmates of public institutions were excluded from
SSI coverage. 99 Congress assumed that "[f]or these people most sub
sistence needs are met by the institution and full benefits are not
needed."loo A partial exception was made to this exclusion: Resi
dents of public medical institutions were entitled to $25 per month if
those institutions were receiving Medicaid payments on their be
half. 101 This comfort allowance was intended to allow recipients to
"purchase small comfort items not supplied by the institution."102
Individuals who resided in institutions not receiving Medicaid bene
fits were excluded from SSI benefits. 103 The Medicaid program pro
vides for most residents in public medical facilities. The program,
however, excludes individuals between the ages of twenty-one and
sixty-five who reside in public institutions for mental illness. 104
95. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
96. 449 U.S. at 179.
97. 42 U.S.c. §§ 1381-1383c (1976). SSI largely replaced assistance programs for
the aged, blind, and disabled contained in Titles I, X, XIV, and XVI of the Social Secur
ity Act. Old Age Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531,49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codi
fied as amended at 42 U.S.c. §§ 301-306 (1976»; Aid to the Blind, Pub. L. No. 74-271,
ch. 531, 49 Stat. 645 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. §§ 1201-1206 (1976»; Aid
to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, Pub. L. No. 81-734, ch. 809, 64 Stat. 555 (1950)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. §§ 1351-1355 (1976»; see 449 U.S. at 223 n.1.
98. See S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1972) [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. No. 1230].
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(I)(A) (1976).
100. S. REP. No. 1230, supra note 98, at 386.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(I)(B) (1976).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(17)(A) (1976).
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Members of this latter group challenged the legislation in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
claiming that the SSI exclusion "constitute[d] a violation of their
rights to equal protection. . . ."105 The district court found that the
statute classified according to mental health 106 and, therefore, sub
jected the SSI exclusion to an intermediate level of scrutiny. 107 The
court held that the exclusion did not withstand intermediate scutiny
and invalidated the statute. lOS The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision, reversed. 109
B. Analysis

The Supreme Court did not reach the question of the appropri
ate level of review for classifications based upon mental health be
cause it found that the statute did not classify on that basis. llo The
Court found the classification to be based upon whether an individ
ual resided in a public institution that received Medicaid benefits on
behalf of the individual. lll The Court then applied the rational ba
sis test, inquiring whether "the classification ... [advanced] legiti
mate legislative goals in a rational fashion."112
If Wilson had followed the rule of Fritz, and had disregarded
the actual purpose of Congress, the rationality requirement easily
would have been satisfied. This deferential approach, however, was
not used: "[T]he classificatory scheme chosen by Congress [must]
rationally [advance] a reasonable and identifiable governmental ob
jective . . . ." 113 The Court then searched the legislative history of
the statute for the goal Congress was attempting to achieve when it
excluded individuals in facilities not receiving Medicaid benefits on
their behalf.114 While a goal was never identified explicitly by Con
gress, the Court found the actual purpose of the Medicaid exclusion
to be the same as that identified by Congress when it originally ex
105. Wilson v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046, 1048 (N.D. Ill. 1979), rev'd sub nom.
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
106. Id. at 1050.
107. Id. at 1053. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
108. 478 F. Supp. at 1054. Wilson was appealed directly to the Supreme Court in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976).
109. 450 U.S. at 239.
110. Id. at 231. But see id. at 241 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). While Justice Powell,
like the majority, did not reach the issue, he thought it "inescapable that appellees are
denied the benefit because they are patients in mental institutions." Id.
Ill. Id. at 232-33.
112. /d. at 234.
1l3. Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
114. See id. at 235-36.
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cluded public mental institutions from Medicaid coverage: "Con
gress believed the States [had] a 'traditional' responsibility to care for
those institutionalized in public mental institutions."115 The Court
found that Congress was aware of this limitation on Medicaid fund
ing when it created the SS! exclusion, and thus "the decision to in
corporate the Medicaid eligibility standards into the SS! scheme
must be considered Congress' deliberate, considered choice." I 16 The
Court upheld the statute because it found that the actual purpose of
the classification was not irrational. ll7
Wilson not only rejected the notion, advanced in Fritz, that
Congress' actual goals are irrelevant, liS but also differed from Fritz
in that the Court took seriously the possibility of legislative over
sight. As in Fritz,1l9 there was evidence that the classification was
not created deliberately, that Congress had inadvertently excluded
appellees from partial SS! coverage. 120 Whereas Fritz readily dis
patched this issue with the statement, "Congress intended what it
enacted,"121 the Wilson Court searched the legislative history for a
"deliberate, considered choice."122
While it appears that the Court did not need much to find this
deliberateness,123 that the Court did look, coupled with the Court's
emphasis on actual purposes, makes Wilson much less deferential
than Fritz. These different approaches to the rationality require
115. Id. at 236-37.
116. Id. at 235.
117. Id. at 238-39.
118. 449 U.S. at 179.
119. See notes 60-69 supra and accompanying text.
120. The only articulated purpose for the exclusion was to prohibit prisoners from
getting the stipend. See H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 150, reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 5136. Appellees claim that the exclusion of the Wilson
class resulted from the bill's inordinate length and complexity. See Brief for Appellees at
37-39, Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees].
121. 449 U.S. at 179.
122. 450 U.S. at 235.
123. The Court determined that Congress deliberately created the classification be
cause the "Committee hearings contained testimony advocating extension of both Medi
caid and SS! benefits to all needy residents in public mental institutions." Id. at 236.
The Court stated that this was evidence that Congress was aware of the Medicaid limita
tions when it placed those same limitations in the SS! program. Id.; see Social Security
Amendments of 1971; Hearings on H.R. 1 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 92d
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 2180, 2408-10, 2479-86, 3257, 3319'(1972). The Court apparently
did not consider the absence of explicit recognition of the classification as significant. By
refusing to view silence as evidence of inadvertence, the Court eliminated one of appel
lees' major arguments: that a classification which harms a politically powerless group is
more likely to be evidence by silence than by explicit mention. See Brief for Appellees at
32-34, supra note 120.
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ment, advanced in these two cases by some of the same Justices,124
not only make it impossible to define what the rational basis test is,
but also to predict which approach will be employed by the Court.
Justice Powell sensed the need for a coherent and consistent equal
protection test of social and economic legislation and attempted to
fashion one in his Wilson dissent. 125
V.

A

MIDDLE GROUND: WILSON AND THE FAIR AND
SUBSTANTIAL TEST

The Wilson majority concluded that the reason SSI benefits
were not granted to residents of public mental institutions was be
cause Congress intended that the states be responsible for such insti
tutions. 126 Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens in the Wilson dissent, saw no purpose for the exclusion. 127
Justice Powell, by virtue of the Court's recent equal protection anal
yses,128 had two approaches available to him. He could have em
ployed the conceivable basis standard to determine whether
Congress rationally could have seen a connection between a prof
fered purpose and the classification. This, almost assuredly, would
have resulted in validation of the legislation. 129 Justice Powell also
could have tested the classification against an articulated legislative
purpose. l3O As he could not find such a purpose, this approach
would have resulted in invalidation of the legislation.
Justice Powell found neither approach appropriate and tested
the legislation against a third standard: that "the classification bear
a fair and substantial relation to the asserted purpose."l31 Justice
Powell proposed that this level of scrutiny be employed when the
purpose of legislation has not been indicated by the legislature, but
has been advanced, after the fact, by the defending litigant. 132
The dissent did not define explicitly the fair and substantial test,
except that it is "marginally more demanding" than the rational ba
sis test. 133 What makes the test more demanding, however, is clear
124. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Stewart, White, and Rehnquist
voted to sustain both statutes.
125. 450 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 236-37.
127. Id. at 239-40 (Powell, J., dissenting).
128. See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
130. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
131. 450 U.S. at 245 (Powell, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 244-45.
133. Id. at 245.
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from the dissent's analysis of classification and purpose. It is not
enough that Congress rationally could have thought there was a con
nection between the two; there must be a connection in fact. 134 The
articulated purpose test and the conceivable basis test, although dif
ferent as to how a purpose is selected, are identical in one respect: A
classification need not be rationally related to its purpose. 135 The
fair and substantial test thus is a more restrictive test. When this test
is employed, the evidence must demonstrate an actual link between
purpose and classification. 136
Justice Powell proposed the fair and substantial test in order to
provide the Court with a more restrictive method of review than that
provided by the conceivable basis test. 137 He stated that while a def
erential approach to social and economic legislation is necessary, 138
a lack of substantive review is the opposite of deference: "When a
legislative purpose can be suggested only by the ingenuity of a gov
. ernment lawyer . . . a reviewing court may be presented not so
much with a legislative policy choice as its absence."139
The conceivable basis test provides virtually no check on irra
tional legislative enactments. Any purpose that the legislature ra
tionally could have had will suffice; 140 it is irrelevant whether the
legislature actually had that purpose. 141 While Justice Powell's test
does not prevent the Court from testing classifications against any
conceivable purpose, it does subject such purposes to a higher stan
dard of review and thus provides protection against truly irrational
classifications. 142
While Justice Powell's apparent purpose in advancing the test
was to modify the conceivable basis approach, the fair and substan
tial test also can be viewed as providing a compromise between the
134. "[I)t is argued [that) Congress rationally could make the judgment that the
States should bear the responsibility for any comfort allowance. . . . There is no logical
link, however, between these two responsibilities." Id. at 246.
135. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
136. See 450 U.S. at 246 (Powell, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 244-45 (Powell, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 243. "The Court must not substitute its view of wise or fair legisla
tive policy for that of the duly elected representatives of the people." Id.
139. Id. at 244 (footnote omitted).
140. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
141. 449 U.S. at 179.
142. Justice Powell's test, like the conceivable basis test, could result in the valida
tion of a classification Congress inadvertently had created. The difference is that the fair
and substantial test would not sustain a statute that is irrational, while the conceivable
basis standard would uphold that same statute if the legislature rationally could have
found a connection between the purpose and the classification.
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conceivable basis and articulated purpose approaches. The latter ap
proach, workable when a classification is accompanied by a legisla
tive purpose, does not provide for the situation where there is no
evidence of legislative purpose. If the Court invalidated statutes
where no purpose was present, the invalidation would not be for lack
of rationality but because the legislature neglected to make its pur
poses known.
The fair and substantial test provides for the situation in which
no goal is stated. Unlike the articulated purpose approach, nonar
ticulated goals could be offered. Unlike the conceivable basis ap
proach, however, the use of those goals would not make validation
virtually automatic; the goals would have to be fairly and substan
tially related to the proffered purpose.
The fair and substantial test thus provides the Court with a rem
edy to the articulated purpose-conceivable basis conflict. While five
Justices did not vote with Justice Powell,143 they did not rej ect his
approach. Justice Powell's test would be employed only when no
indication of legislative purpose exists.l44 The Wilson majority,
however, found a purpose in the legislative history,145 and thus had
no opportunity to decide whether the fair and substantial test was
appropriate.
That five Justices have yet to decide on the issue could bode
well for the Court's acceptance of Justice Powell's test. This, how
ever, highlights the weakest aspect of the test: Even if the Court did
adopt Justice Powell's approach, the Court still could remain defer
ential to the legislature simply by finding some indication of pur
pose. Wilson may be an example of how little is needed to find this
indication. 146 Justice Powell's test could provide the Court with an
effective method of review of social and economic legislation, but
only if the Court does not strain to find legislative purpose where
none is indicated.
If the Court can resolve the problem of when legislative purpose
is indicated, Justice Powell's dissent provides an alternative to the
conceivable basis and articulated purpose approaches. His alterna
tive gives the Court an opportunity to state definitively how it will
review social and economic legislation that is unaccompanied by leg
islative purpose.
143. The five Justices were Chief Justice Burger and Justices B1ackmun, Stewart,
White, and Rehnquist.
144. 450 U.S. at 244-45.
145. See id. at 236-37.
146. See note 115 supra.
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CONCLUSION

In the area of social and economic legislation, the constitutional
requirement of equal protection mandates that classifications be ra
tionally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. 147 If the Supreme
Court finds that the legislature could have seen a logical connection
between the purpose and the classification, the requirement of ra
tionality will be upheld. 148 Before the Court can discern whether a
classification is rational, however; it first must identify a purpose
against which the classification is to be judged. 149 The Court has
developed two methods by which to identify legislative purposes.
The first, the conceivable basis approach, allows the Court to postu
late or accept any purpose. 150 The second, the articulated purpose
approach, requires that the Court test the classification against a pur
pose articulated by Congress. 1S1 The method that the Court chooses
to employ could mean the difference in whether the challenged legis
lation stands or falls. Despite the obvious difference in the ap
proaches, the Court appears to employ arbitrarily either test in
similar situations, leaving litigants to speculate what the Court might
do.
This situation was evidenced in United States Railroad Retire
ment Board v. Fritz lS2 and Schweiker v. Wilson }S3 While the statutes
were upheld in both cases, the Court employed different rationales to
achieve the results. IS4 Both Fritz and Wilson concerned equal pro
tection challenges to social welfare legislation. Evidence existed in
both cases that indicated the disputed classifications were a result of
congressional oversight, ISS and thus were irrational. Despite these
similarities, the Court employed the conceivable basis test in Fritz
and the articulated purpose approach in Wilson.
Another major difference between these cases is the way each
handled the issue of the inadvertent creation of classifications. Fritz
virtually eliminated any possibility of demonstrating irrationality
147. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
148. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
149. See 449 U.S. at 184 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan goes on to say
that the Fritz majority eliminates this step. See also note 94 supra.
150. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
151. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
152. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
153. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
154. Fritz tested the legislation against aposl hoc purpose, while Wilson looked to
the actual congressional purposes. See notes 55-59 & 113-17 supra and accompanying
text.
155. See notes 67 & 120 supra and accompanying text.
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through evidence of legislative oversight by holding that Congress
intends what it enacts. 156 As Congress acted with intention, there
must be a purpose for the classification, and the Court then allows
one to be offered. 157 Wilson treated the question of inadvertence
more seriously. Although the Court did find the classification's en
actment purposeful,158 it did· so by looking to the legislative his
toryl59 and not by relying on the truism that Congress intends what
it enacts.
In order to end the confusion over rational basis as evidenced
by Fritz and Wilson, Justice Powell, in the Wilson dissent,160 offered
a third approach. Justice Powell's test liberalizes the articulated pur
pose approach by allowing legislation to be tested against a post hoc
purpose. This asserted purpose, however, would not be tested by the
rational basis formula of whether the legislature could have found a
rational connection between the classification and the purpose. Jus
tice Powell's test also modifies the conceivable basis test and requires
a post hoc purpose to bear a fair and substantial relation to the clas
sification. 161 This stricter test would mean that a logical connection
between classifications would have to exist in fact. 162
Justice Powell's fair and substantial test offers a way out of this
seemingly arbitrary selection process. The advantages of Justice
Powell's test are persuasive. The test allows the Court to be deferen
tial while affording protection against arbitrary enactments, and it
provides the Court with an opportunity to adopt a coherent, consis
tent approach to equal protection challenges to social and economic
legislation. The Court, in order to benefit itself, potential litigants,
and the public, should adopt Justice Powell's fair and substantial
test.
Dennis Caraher

156. 449 U.S. at 179.
157. Id. at 177.
158. 450 U.S. at 236.
159. Id. at 235-36.
160. Id. at 239 (Powell, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 244-45.
162. Id. at 246.

